Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42 Paperback – Illustrated, January 14, 2014

hawkish paranoia about distant threats can create the very monster that is most feared.That sentence sums up this story nicely.William Dalrymple has written an impressive and scholarly history of the British disaster that was their first incursion into Afghanistan. This is a very complex story, involving a large cast of characters. It is exhaustive, but not exhausting, and to help the reader through this very interesting and sad story, there is a listing of the major players in about twenty pages containing a brief summary of their role, and a large group of illustrations to accompany the information. With that, you can easily see that the Afghans are split between the Sadozais, and the Barakzais and the British are themselves split between those who favor the old Shah Shuja, and those favoring the upcoming Dost Mohammad Khan. Top that off with Lord Auckland, the British Governor General, who was appointed and knew little of the region, and throw in the perceived threat of Russian interference in the region and you have the perfect martini of disaster, shaken and not stirred.The British infighting as to the political opinions given came out in favor of the spymasters and political advisors favoring the Shah Shuja, who was not the most popular candidate for the rule of the tribes of Afghanistan. He had alread attempted to regain the throne on three occasions; he was not liked by the people, and he simply had more bad luck than anyone deserved. The real power was Dost Mohammad.The short summary is that the British East India Company marched a 20,000 man army into Afghanistan and occupied Kabul (which in itself took a grueling eight months and far too encumbered with baggage) and stayed there far too long. While there never seemed to be any enthusiasm for Shah Shuja among the people, the peace was only maintained by British money which kept the uppercrust happy, but once Auckland decided to pull funds and men away from Afghanistan and use it in China, the thing started to unravel. The British in Kabul were hampered by their own incompetence (among the most glaring was their barracks being built in an untenable position and their store houses equally troublesome and across the river), and the Afghans, once smelling weaknesses pounced on it like a cat on a mouse. The locals, who were always infighting, now united against the British and by the time they left, in the dead of winter, their entire force was destroyed, save one man who made it out. Another army was raised for retribution and destroyed Kabul.There it is, and without going into a lot of politics, i have to wonder why people that are running our State Department don't read history, because today's events are nothing more than a rehash of 170 years ago. This book illustrates that in foreign diplomacy (or in this case, occupation) you cannot manage without accurate information on the ground. The British had conflicting reports from two political advisors with opposite views, and compounding that was the ultimate decision makers dealing with confounding information and the great amount of time required to correspond. Today, we don't have the time problem, but it appears that our government is a bull that brings its own china shop wherever it goes.I highly recommend this book as a scholarly work. It is very interesting and not a quick read at all.

In Hollywood the "idiot plot" is a story that can only progress if key characters behave like complete idiots. In this case it refers to the British invasion of Afghanistan in the 1840s, not this excellent book by William Dalrymple.Dalrymple provides plenty of background. During the Napoleonic wars the French and Russians plotted an attempt to invade India through Central Asia. While the scheme never went too far, the British lived in needless fear that Russian involvement in Afghanistan would threaten their empire. British intrigue brought about the Russian diplomatic moves that they feared. As a result, the British invaded Afghanistan to replace Dost Mohammed, an effective though despotic ruler, with Shah Shujah, the "rightful" king of Afghanistan. Shujah wasn't a bad man, he just lacked the popularity and political skill that Dost Mohammed had. Dalrymple gives Shujah more credit than he usually gets; if the British had followed his advice they would have at least survived their invasion.Problems started with the invasion. The British were unprepared for the Afghans' guerilla attacks, as well as the weather and geography. Once established in Kabul they managed things very ineptly. The military initially treated their time in Kabul as a holiday outing. They lived in cantonments that were very vulnerable to attack. Their ammunition, treasury, and provisions were located away from the army's main location. The British antagonized the population. They cut the subsidies to the various tribes. Their spending drove up prices. Their womanizing couldn't have been more calculated to antagonize the locals.There are many fascinating characters, some flat out stupid. Readers of  Flashman: A Novel  will recognize many. The second-in-command, Brigadier Shelton, was cantankerous and stubborn. When his unit was under attack he formed it into squares. This was a sound tactic against cavalry, but made his men easy targets for the excellent Afghan shots. The commander, General William Elphinstone, was in terrible health and probable too passive, ineffective, and indecisive to begin with. British diplomats were more competent but mismanaged the situation. The envoy, William Mcnaughten, was intelligent but arrogant and determined to ignore bad news. Alexander Burnes, the political office ignored warnings and lived away from the army. Both Mcnaughten and Burns were murdered. When the situtation deteriated the British did not move into the Bala Hissar, and excellent fortress.British sources indicate that they believed that the Afghans did not concern treachery to be a vice. There's at least some truth to this, but the British were no better. It was Mcnaughten's violation of an agreement that brought about his murder. The British abandoned the Indian sepoys to the Afghans, planting the seeds for the mutiny of 1857.While the invasion and occupation were poorly run, the retreat was a catastrophe. The British didn't consider an alternative route where they would be completely safe. In the worst possible winter weather they retreated through the passes with insufficient clothing, food, and ammunition. The coda was a disaster, too. The British "Army of Retribution" lived up to its name. It demolished impressive architecture such as the bazaar and ruined the Afghans ability to govern themselves. Before the 1840s Afghanistan was not the seemingly hopeless case it has been since.This is the best book I have read on the subject. Dalrymple's research includes Afghan sources, as well as private British collections that weren't previously available. The book is very readable. There are a few shortcomings that shouldn't discourage readers too much. For all its exhaustiveness, Dalrymple misses a few events. For example, Elphinstone shot himself in the buttocks. Also, Elphinstone formed a "united front" at the rear guard during the retreat.Reviewers make much of the similarities between the British 19th century experience and today's situation in Afghanistan. Regrettably, Dalrymple lets his biases affect this short part of the book. Dalrymple doesn't mention that the Taliban causes most civilian casualties. Dalrymple ignores the fact that unlike the British, NATO forces were not defeated militarily. NATO is withdrawing for lack of political nerve and popular support. The decision to announce a withdrawal date in advance is one worhy of Mcnaughten and Elphinstone.One slur, not typical of the rest of the book, is Dalrymple's statement that NATO's invasion was "neo-colonial." He contradicts this when he criticizes NATO for thinking it could leave after a few years and notes that it was trying to set up a democracy. Colonizers don't behave that way. Dalrymple doesn't mention that the Taliban originated in Pakistan and are alien to Afghan traditions. He questions the motivation for the invasion, ignoring the obvious:We were attacked.There is no mention of September 11, whose perpetrators were based in Afghanistan. NATO did not have the option to ignore al Qaeda's base. Afghanistan's status as a failed state made an attempt to establish democracy worth trying. In hindsight, it would have been better to follow the practice Dalrymple mentions earlier of winning support from individual tribes. In any case, the invasion of Afghanistan was honorable.Unfortunately, Afghanistan has little to look forward to. Dalrymple quotes an Afghan saying that China will be the next invader. Before then, I think a civil war is likely, with factions supported by Iran and Pakistan. The misery in Afghanistan is likely to continue.These criticisms only concern a small part of Dalrymple's story. While there is much to regret in Afghanistan's history, reading this book is a very worthwhile experience. I strongly recommend it.

Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-1842 by William Dalrymple is a gripping and meticulously researched account of the First Anglo-Afghan War, a pivotal yet often overlooked episode in the history of Afghanistan and British imperialism.Historical NarrativeDalrymple chronicles the events leading up to the British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839 and the subsequent disastrous retreat in 1842. He draws on a wide array of primary sources, including diaries, letters, and official documents, to reconstruct the political intrigues, military campaigns, and cultural clashes that characterized this tumultuous period. His narrative provides a comprehensive and vivid portrayal of the complexities involved in British-Afghan relations during the 19th century.Characters and PerspectivesCentral to the book are the various key figures involved, including British political officers, Afghan rulers, tribal leaders, and ordinary soldiers. Dalrymple skillfully weaves together their perspectives, motivations, and actions, offering insights into their roles in shaping the course of the war. This multi-dimensional approach humanizes the historical narrative and enhances the reader's understanding of the individuals caught up in the conflict.Cultural and Political ContextDalrymple contextualizes the First Anglo-Afghan War within the broader geopolitical landscape of the time. He explores the British imperial ambitions in South Asia, the Great Game rivalry with Russia, and the intricate socio-cultural dynamics of Afghan society. His analysis sheds light on the complexities of foreign intervention and the challenges of governing a diverse and fiercely independent nation like Afghanistan.Military Campaigns and StrategiesThe book vividly describes the military campaigns, battles, and sieges that unfolded during the war. Dalrymple provides detailed accounts of the strategic decisions, tactical maneuvers, and battlefield engagements, illustrating the harsh realities faced by both British and Afghan forces. His narrative captures the brutality of warfare in rugged Afghan terrain and the human cost of imperial ambitions.Legacy and Reflection"Return of a King" also examines the lasting impact of the First Anglo-Afghan War on Afghanistan, Britain, and the wider region. Dalrymple reflects on the lessons learned from this historical episode, particularly in relation to the challenges of foreign intervention, nation-building, and the resilience of Afghan society. The book offers valuable insights into the complexities of modern Afghan history and its implications for contemporary geopolitics.Literary StyleDalrymple's writing is engaging and accessible, blending scholarly rigor with narrative flair. His ability to convey historical events with vivid detail and emotional resonance captivates readers, making the book both informative and compelling. The careful pacing and insightful analysis ensure that the complex narrative unfolds smoothly, keeping the reader invested from beginning to end.Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-1842 by William Dalrymple is a masterful historical account that brings to life the dramatic events of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Through meticulous research and vivid storytelling, Dalrymple illuminates the complexities of imperial ambition, military strategy, and cultural exchange in 19th-century Afghanistan. The book is essential reading for anyone interested in Afghan history, British imperialism, and the enduring challenges of foreign intervention in the region.

Every ruler, officer, diplomat and civil servant should read and absorb the lessons from this remarkable scholarship.During the Russian occupation, I was befriended by a Dari speaking Afghan who was no warrior, but he told me that "The Russians will be thrown out, they do not understand us, we fight for our independence until the last child throws the last stone".And this was long before the USA got involved.David S. SimclairCanada

avvincente e critica revisione storica della tragica invasione inglese dell'Afganistan del 1840. Come negli altri libri di Darlymple ritengo molto accurata e ben documentata la ricostruzione storica ed imparziale il commento. Una lettura interessante ed avvincente, da consigliare vivamente a tutti quelli interessati alla storia della dominazione inglese in India.

Better be kept on the shelf on display for ready reference. Just in case politicians of the future suggest to invade Afghanistan to establish whatever will be the reasoning for military intervention then.Some of the reasons and justifications given by the British imperialists at the middle of the 19th century sound very similar to what was said in the 21st.

William Dalrymple's THE RETURN OF A KING is about Afghanistan, which means it's about death in its most horrible forms. A mouth is stuffed with gunpowder and the head blown up; a Shah's eyes are pieced: the hot point of a needle `'quickly spilled the wine of his sight from the cup of his eyes;'' children are strapped to the mouth of a cannon and blasted away before their parents suffer the same fate; soldiers `'slice off the genitals of the fallen and place them in the corpses' mouths''; displeasure is shown by systematically cutting off servants' ears, noses and privates--but sparing their lives so that they can continue to serve; others are scalped. Afghans appreciated fruit, having 40 kinds of grapes, and other fruits, such as those described by the renowned poet Khushal Khan `'There is a boy across the river with a bottom like a peach/But alas! I cannot swim.'' The book concerns the placing of Shah Shuja on his throne. (Another excellent book on the same subject is Ben Macintyre's THE MAN WHO WOULD BE KING.) The reading of Dalrymple's book goes slowly until around page 300 (no fault of Dalrymple's, it's just that the soldiers led incredibly boring lives, unable to function in the heat, pampered by innumerable servants) when all hell breaks out. Because of English arrogance, poor policy decisions and their turning Kabul into an open-air brothel, the Afghans finally rose up and slaughtered them, scenes involving children which had to be skipped over. Among Afghans themselves, the best policy seems to have always been to butcher one's enemy, Afghan or other, a policy taken for granted among their own but seemingly never understood by outsiders--today as yesteryear. Like a hornet's nest (or a warning not to touch a hot stove), they really should be left alone. My own books can be found on Amazon under Michael Hone.