The Battle for Moscow

This is an excellent book. He really makes the horror of the battle come alive in new ways and across all levels of combat. He takes the reader to the snow filled trenches to the fight between the Generals at the gates over tactics and supplies. He gives good context to the story. You will rethink the importance of the battle. You will see the battle as where the war changed, not Stalingrad. Their offense really culminated there and never was quite the same afterwards.That becomes very real when you read about the strength numbers of the Germans. Whole units were just grounded down to nothing from the constant battle since June. He also puts to death the almost idea. The Germans didn't almost make anything. Had they closed the last 40 miles or so they wouldn't have the strength to do the block by block fight which would have under gone. The masterful way the story was told about how the Germans shot their bolt will make you rethink the impact. of the Soviet counteroffensive. There wasn't anything but a handful of Germans left to push back. It was a mere academic exercise at that point.I loved his conclusion chapter. It sums up things in a nice package.

As Stahel and many other authors have stated over the last 75 years Germany was defeated when Barbarossa began. Hitler tried to wage war in Russia with National Socialist political ideology but ran into another even more ruthless opponent in Communist Russia. The inability of the German High Command to grasp the actual situation in the front lines ultimately led to the last gasp outside Moscow before the Russian winter offensive. 25 years after the fall of the Soviet Union we now need some books written from the Russian point of view washed of the Soviet propaganda-'All glory to the great military genius Generalissimo Stalin!'

I wanted to learn more on the Battle of Moscow since it was one of the largest battles of World War II and one of the most important despite being overlooked in favor of Stalingrad, D-Day, or the Bulge. I enjoyed this book a lot and found it hard to put down. The author does not shy away at all of the brutality and war crimes of the Eastern Front. I loved the maps and photos the most. A worthy addition to any WW2 buff's collection.

This book both tells a riveting story and thoroughly debunks a myth. The story is the story of the German November 1941 effort to take Moscow, and the successful Soviet effort, not just to hold it, but to significantly wear down the German attackers.The myth debunked is the notion that the Germans came close to taking the city. They did in fact come close to the city, as measured in miles. But getting close to the objective is an empty achievement if the forces that have got close lack the means to capitalize on geographic proximity by outright taking the objective. [Or even, if that should be impossible, getting close enough to subject it to punishing artillery attack.]The author recounts in careful yet not dull style how the German drive was doomed from the start by a combination of supply difficulties, weather difficulties, and Soviet resistance. He recounts also how the Soviets held major reserves back from the fighting, parceling a bit of them out on rare occasion when the Germans had some unexpected tactical success which could not be permitted to blossom into operational significance. These reserves were intended for the Soviet December riposte, and they were eventually committed as planned, fresh and well supplied, to that effort. But if they had been needed to hold the city, they would have more than sufficed. The Soviets had stripped other sectors perilously thin to be sure of victory at Moscow, but having done so, they had a sure thing. (As to those other sectors, the book devotes relatively little space. But there is a nice little quote from the diary of Wilhelm Prueller, on hearing that his motorized division was to be sent East, less its vehicles, as infantry, from Kursk, with the mission of taking far-distant Voronezh. "How fatuous!...And all you can do the whole time you serve is to marvel. So I laughed, and laughed heartily, out of malicious joy at my own misfortune."And that about sums it up. The German drive on Moscow was a fool's errand and it never came close to taking the city.

I've learned a lot from all Mr. Stahel's books about the Eastern Front. Some reviewers seem to think he pushes his viewpoint somewhat aggressively; I have not noticed this. What I have noticed is a wealth of interesting and informative detail that I have not seen in other histories. I recommend all of Mr. Stahel's books, and this one in particular.

Gives a unique perspective that I had never encountered in any other books about the battle for Moscow. I am particularly glad to see that an author that I have read, has finally put the blame for the atrocities committed against the Russian soldiers and citizens on the Werhmacht, from the generals down to the privates.

The author is very much breaking new ground with his analysis of campaigns in the East. I am looking forward to his future works and his opinions on how the waring parties progressed the conflict. There are many personal accounts of the battles in the East and "matter of fact" reviews of troop movements..but this is a more modern treatment of the topic. I hope you enjoy the book.

This gentleman writes good history, which corrects so many often repeated and until relatively recently were accepted views of the German war in Russia.The text is well presented it reads well and gives you an accurate and complete account of the condition and expectations placed upon both the German and Soviet forces which would confront each other outside Moscow.if you still consider that it was the mud and the winter which stopped the Germans please buy this book it will give you a less jaundiced view of what took place and why the German attack never stood a realistic chance of success as well as tellingyou how the Red Army defended their capital and defeated Germany in 1941.

This is the fourth book in the series discussing the war on the eastern front. The first book was about the first two months of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, followed by a book about the battle for western Ukraine in September 1941, and a third about Operation Typhoon in October-November 1941. This one picks up where the last book left off.In late November/early December, after a short period of rest, the German army Group Centre resumed its offensive and made an attempt to capture Moscow. At the time the outside world held its breath and watched with horror and fascination the battle unfold. Many believed that if Moscow were to fall, then the war would be over and Germany would be triumphant. As years went by, the battle for Moscow became mythical. Only the battle for Stalingrad could eclipse it in its epic quality.The popular myth of the Battle for Moscow is that the Germans came within an inch of capturing the Russian capital and it was only the fanatical (and suicidal) resistance of the exhausted Russian troops that stopped them. Had the outside world had access to this book while the battle was still going on, the outside world would have yawned, shrugged its shoulders and went back to doing other things. For you see, the outcome of the battle was never in doubt. And in any case, German victory at Moscow would have not changed the outcome of the war.By late November the German army in Russia was almost totally exhausted—exhausted emotionally, psychologically, materially, logistically and even militarily. The Germans were short on everything from manpower to equipment to even such basic necessities as food, fuel and ammunition. Five months of constant fighting had drained all strength out of them. Back in Germany there were very few fresh troops to relieve them, and the Germany industry and economy could not sustain this level of war effort. Already in late 1941 Hitler’s economic advisors were telling him that he must either seek political end to the war or Germany was going to lose.Sure, Germans were able to launch offensives and win a battle here and there, but by late November they didn’t have the slightest chance of capturing Moscow. And even if by some miracle they did capture it, the war would have continued and the Soviets would have won anyway. Among Soviet leaders there was never any intention of surrendering if Moscow were to fall, and there was still a lot of land to retreat to. Keep in mind that in 1812 Napoleon captured Moscow and forced the Tsar to flee his own capital. Few months later the Grande Armé did not exist anymore and the French emperor had to flee all the way back to Paris.But the book is not only about military operations and fighting. It also touches heavily on the atrocities committed by Germans and how full of hate the war become. The account you will find in this book are sickening to read. They will also dispel the post war myths that the Wermacht was all noble and gentlemanly, and it was the SS who acted barbarically. Yes, the SS was barbaric and murderous, make no mistake, but regular German army was no better.The book has its weaknesses. For one, the author concentrates almost exclusively on the Germans and speaks little about what was going on in the Red Army. But of course, he has the right to focus on one area more than on another. Perhaps this is not so much a weakness as a personal preference. Still, I would prefer a more balanced discussion about the two adversaries.Also, the author portrays the German situation as being truly catastrophic by early December 1941. Fine, but if the situation was so bad, then how come Germany managed to fight on until 1945? In fact, aside for a defeat here and there, Germans managed to hold off the Red Army until 1944. It was only in 1944 that the Russians finally broke the German resistance and started to rapidly regain lost territories. An army that is at the breaking point, as the author describes the Germans to be in late 1941, could have never hold on for two more years.Perhaps future books will explain it.

I have read the previous three volumes of his study of the Soviet/German war in 1941, and I rate this as highly as the rest. Stahel brings his argument to a strong conclusion here; that the German Armed Forces had no real chance to defeat the USSR in 1941, that the extent of German gains mask the vast loss of strength and logistical obstacles imposed by the Red Army and by Russia itself, that the capture of Moscow was no less a fantasy than was the capture of Leningrad. He also shows how the magical thinking inherent in Nazi ideology forced the commanders of Army Group Centre to persist on the attack long after any hope of victory was gone, setting their forces up for a massive defeat in the winter of 1941/42.I'm interested to know how the author intends to proceed from here. Over four volumes he has made his case most profoundly for Operation Barbarossa as an untenable operation of war. For myself, I'd be pleased to see his scholarship directed to the rest of the narrative, in sequence, or to other aspects of the war that he can enlighten us on.

Amazing Book, The mystery of battle of Moscow has been exposed properly with both depth and breadth. It gives clear and precise answer about the question of why did Wehrmacht collapsed in front of Moscow. It also has an hidden message that the days of aggressive war is in the distant past. War monger nations will ultimately cause extreme sufferings to their own people and the same people have to leave in perennial shame for long time to come. Lets hope Germany finds its true humane soul which i think it has found it more or less.Let one nation of humanity prosper.

I really enjoyed this book.