Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914 (General Military)

The title of Winston Churchill's 1932 book on the Eastern Front in World War I, "The Unknown War," was a very apt one. With the exception of Churchill's book, and a few others, the Eastern Front has been largely neglected by the English speaking world. The current volume goes a long way towards filling this gap.The author sets the stage by examining the armies of the three great imperial antagonists, offers many valuable insights into their organization and ethos and traces the development of the war plans of all three powers. Germany started the war focused on its plans, developed by von Schlieffen, to quickly overwhelm France first, and then turn eastwards. Austria-Hungary's planning was dominated by its chief of staff, Conrad, who overestimated the capabilities of his forces, was haunted by the specter of the Redl spy scandal and couldn't make up his mind whether to deploy primarily against Russia or Serbia. Russia was still trying to absorb the lessons of its disastrous war against Japan a decade earlier, and its high command was riven by the antagonism between the adherents and opponents of the War Minister, Sukhomlinov. All three armies were wedded to the concept of offensive warfare, ensuring that the resultant collision would be one of titanic violence.As perhaps only to be expected, the author devotes a great deal of space to the Tannenberg campaign, the best known of all Eastern Front battles, but he goes far beyond this military classic. He also recounts the follow up First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, which ended the Russian invasion of East Prussia, and provides detailed accounts of literally every battle that was fought in the East in 1914. From the battles that pitted Austria-Hungary against Russia in Galicia, to the autumn campaign in Poland that culminated in the Battle of Lodz, to Austria's bungled invasions (yes, multiple, unsuccessful invasions!) of Serbia, the author makes these often complex maneuverings and battles comprehensible. He wraps the book up with recounting the futile attempts by the Germans to expand further into Poland as winter set in, and a truly obscure little Austrian victory in Galicia just before Christmas which gave the reeling Hapsburg legions a badly needed morale boost. In short, nothing that happened in the East in 1914 is neglected, a true tour-de-force!As we watch the armies in action, their strengths and weaknesses become glaringly obvious. The author does not practice advocacy on behalf of any of the belligerents, but the Germans definitely come across as the most capable as well as the most successful of the combatants. One of the greatest of their strengths was the independent initiative of German corps and division commanders, which in the case of von Francois, amounted to insubordination, but almost invariably resulted in success on the battlefield. Another strength of the Germans was the bond between officers and men, which extended all the way to the top; we see Kaiser Wilhelm congratulating a successful division commander and making sure to tell him to pass his royal thanks along to the rank and file in his division. Little wonder that the morale of the German army was still high at the end of 1914.The Austrians and Russians come across in a far less flattering light. Conrad, after finally deciding to deploy the bulk of his forces to face the Russians, stripped the gears of the clunky Austrian railway network trying to transfer troops north from the Serbian front, thus contributing to the Russian victories in Galicia. He continued to set impossible goals for his troops and was unwilling or unable to inspire them, remaining ensconced in his headquarters castle in Teschen. He acquiesced in the dismissal of Auffenberg, one of the few successful Austrian generals in the early stages of the war, but allowed Potiorek to botch three invasion attempts against Serbia. By the end of the year, the low morale of the Hapsburg forces was the polar opposite of their German allies. The Russians, for their part, were plagued by the factional rivalry described above and by utter failure of the Russian generals to cooperate or coordinate with each other on the battlefield, the Rennenkampf-Samsonov communications void at Tannenberg being the best known, but certainly not the only case in point. The Russian army was further hampered by shortages of artillery shells and rifles. Tactically, the Russian soldier was stolid and unyielding on defense, but clumsy on the offense, which contributed to atrocious casualties. One German officer could not help but reflect that Russian troops actually seemed happy to be taken prisoner.In short, with its comprehensive coverage of all the action on the Eastern Front in 1914, enlivened by letters, diaries and other accounts of the participants, this is the ultimate book on the subject. The dust jacket promises that this is the first of a three volume set on WWI in the East, and I, for one can't wait to read the next volume! Where else am I going to find a detailed account of the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes?

Buttar's War on the Eastern Front, 1914 is a complex strategic and tactical read requiring supplemental tools to fully appreciate. This is not a light read. It is complicated because the German and Russian units carried the same names ... i.e. German 2nd Army faced off against the Russian 2nd Army. It is complicated because the same numbered divisions and brigades engage. It is complicated because commanders on both sides share 'von' and Germanic names. You have to work through it. If you're not up for the extra effort, take a pass on this book and read about the specific battles.The advantage of this read is in visualizing the dynamics of the whole. The battles of Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes, Silesia, and Lodz require the active reader to look at external sources to visualize the topography and daily movements. The extensive numbers of maps employed in the book are simply not enough. This is not criticism but a matter of comprehending the movement of million man armies.The vast scale of the nearly 1000 mile long Eastern Front has no similarity to the Western Front where Germany's execution of the Schlieffen plan focused on a relatively small geographic area. The Eastern Front armies moved much more fluidly, at the speed of a bike, horse or foot, and across horrendous distances to mount the colossal confrontations. Trench warfare and stalemate never developed. The Eastern Front narrative is about cavalry, artillery and infantry and most strategically ... logistics and communication, though none of the belligerents had a comprehension of the demand for coordination across distances or of consuming a year's worth of `plan' every 3 weeks. Battles seem to end when the ammo runs out and disengaging devolves to bayonets.The main theme of this opening 4 months is defined by Buttar in contrasting the critical elements of the belligerents:1. Germany delivered far more bang for the buck and all parties knew it. The German's fielded spot on artillery teams, an extraordinarily cohesive command structure that left the front commanders authorized to adapt to opportunities that all in all provided the uncanny ability to take command of the field and move out to accomplish flanking and rear attacks. Germany won or drew even in the major battles with fewer men.2. Russia delivered an overwhelming mass of untrained cannon fodder ... and that was the plan. France seems to hold a Svengali power over the Czar that drove the Russians to throw fate and mass at the Germans to save the failing Western Front. They don't enter an engagement with less than a 2:1 advantage. The Czarist army was led by two nasty competing internal factions and just never got it right. The Russians get the nod for mounting the best defense. Buttar reveals nuances that tell volumes ... many of the front line NCO's and few of the individual soldiers had ever seen a mechanical clock and couldn't tell time. Russian central command issued excruciatingly detailed tactical timing orders. Losing 2.5M men at a 10:1 ratio against the Germans was no accident.3. The Austro-Hungarians were an offense-only cavalry machine. They did have the biggest artillery. Unfortunately, they had incredibly poor artillery skills and independent command in an Army that loved horse cavalry charges that ran into their own barrages. The armies of the Dual Monarchy spoke 7 different languages so, perhaps, the hive-like strategy of Attack, Attack, Attack made perfect sense. In the 4 months of 1914 ... their full frontal assault mentality cost 1M men to Russians in Galicia and .25M attacking the dug in and militarily puny Serbs. The Dual Monarchy loses men, real estate and morale at an appalling rate. They burned themselves up in just 4 months.This is a 3-4 week study to get through the 450 or so pages. 5 star deep dive!

I thought I knew a lot about World War I because I know a bit about the war on the Western Front, mainly from films, TV documentaries, poetry, the memoirs of poets like Robert Graves and a few novels. It’s only in recent years that I’ve begun to learn more about the campaigns in Africa and the Middle East. Then I searched in vain for a good, detailed history of the war on the Eastern Front, until I discovered Pritt Buttar’s series for Osprey.Collision of Empires is the first of a series of four volumes. It’s lengthy, erudite and packed references and quotations from the key players on all sides. The author manages to combine detailed narrative of events with insightful analysis of why operations succeeded, failed or just sank into the mud. A couple of examples…..The author begins by giving detailed accounts of how the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies developed in the second half of the nineteenth-century and the early years of the twentieth in terms of weapons technology, strategy and tactics and the crucial reliance on extensive and efficient rail services to get troops and supplies to the right place at the right time. He then shows how the ruinous preference for offence over defence became official dogma in most European armies decades before the war began, and how lessons about the destructive power of artillery and machine guns against attacking infantry failed to be learned as far back as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1.Once the war has begun the author gives us detailed accounts of the early campaigns – Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes, Serbia etc. – followed by analysis of why they failed or succeeded overall and the performance of individual commanders. What is striking is how those commanders who had an opportunity, years later, to write their memoirs or contribute to official histories frequently overlooked their own blunders or credited themselves with flashes of genius (which were not apparent at the time) while often providing shrewd appraisals of their comrades. In addition, the author does not just focus on the generals; he quotes from the letters of junior officers and the rank and file. He also spares more than just a thought for the Poles, whose land was ravaged by the Great Powers fighting their power games across the Polish countryside and cities.I intend to read the remaining three volumes this year and I would recommend this series to anyone who wants to understand an aspect of World War I that is often overlooked in the UK.

Very good book on the first 4 months of the forgotten Eastern Front of World War One. I had to skip the first hundred pages as it was political and mentions the cause of the war, that I have read many times before. Great detail was spent on the battle's of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, but only one chapter on the Serbian Front. I felt that Max Hastings book Catastrophe, describes the opening phase of the Eastern Front, including Serbia in greater detail, even though it is not as long as this single volume book, hence 4 stars instead of five.

Compared to Geoffrery Wawro's enraged account of the KuK Pritt Buttar's wider ranging title is much more circumspect in apportioning blame (or perhaps just more forgiving in the first place). One encounters both sides catching each other out, both sides making mistakes (and sometimes no-one noticing). Buttar brings out the issues of war with limited communications by inexperieced forces in the vastness of the Borderlands. Where the book fails is to provide maps for the last third of the campaign making it hard to grasp the Łódź campaign.

This is the first of four books by Prit Buttar on the eastern front in WW I. IMHO they are excellent, providing exhaustive information on the technical/military level plus thoughtful insights on overall strategy, the internal affairs of the three powers concerned, sharp criticism where appropriate, especially of the Austrian and Russian leadership and their command systems, useful biographical details about the protagonists. I have now reached the third volume ("Russia's Last Gasp") and will only mention here an example of Buttar's perceptive insights I just came across, on page 46, about how the decimation of the officers' numbers during the first two years of the war led to a change in the social composition of the officer corps in the German army and the detrimental effects of this change on the morale and effectiveness of the army. Excellent stuff, anyone interested in WW I should read these.

This is a well-written book but difficult to follow because the maps are few and far between, small scale, attempt to show multiple movements, and frequently do not even feature places named in the book.A pity, for this book looks to fill a much-needed gap in the coverage of WW1.