Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II

Zaloga tends to put a lot of thought and effort into his books. He provides pictures, tables, analysis galore. Detailed accounts such as Harry Yeides "The Infantry's Armor" also illustrate the concept that tankers did quite well with Shermans, and do so without need of technical discussions. They confirm that in combat tankers equipped with U.S. weapons did well even towards the end of the war. U.S. equipment was not the best in terms of guns and armor - and the users deserved better - but it worked quite well for the job called on it.Zaloga’s obsession with high powered cannon to the point of misrepresenting the 90mm and 76mm guns with inaccurate data and wrong comparisons, and his belittling of the U.S. Ordnance Department’s engineering throughout the book are great examples of why some people think the M4 was inferior. Did the U.S. loose it’s ground war because it lacked a super-gun? No.Zaloga's books have provided invaluable details I have not found elsewhere; but his explanations need work and some technical details are flat out wrong.Tank Destroyer Doctrine was symptomatic of the muddied thinking and poor leadership that existed. George Marshall implemented it and should have at least shut it off by 1943 (preferably never implemented it) as a needless, distracting diversion of the Army's resources. The M10, M18 and M36 were tanks by any other name, negating any phoney-baloney nonsense about tanks not being the answer to tanks. Reserves to counter hostile forces was a given, so there was no need for a "Tank Destroyers" reserve. He also needed to get McNair, Ordnance, Armored Forced, and the Combat Commanders together to quit spinning their wheels. Build some tanks for field tests and learn what they could do. McNair should have been canned (at least reprimanded and his actions reversed) for usurping the Armored Forces role and disrupting the Army Chain of command.“McNair’s Folly” is “Bradly’s Folly” – towed 3-inch guns only got into Europe because Bradly (top planner for the U.S. side) wanted them. And then he wanted the even heavier 90mm towed anti-tank gun.“Battleworthiness” and “battle need” were not “McNair’s Laws”; they were the SOP of the U.S. Army. For example, Devers and the Armored Forces rejected the quick-fix M4 (76) because it did not meet their criteria for being battle worthy (the turret was too cramped).The Chief of Ordnance in office between 1938 and 1942 personally rejected two requests to develop a new, better cannon than the 37mm. During his reign, the only new TANK and ANTITANK cannon were based on existing materials thrown together, resulting in sub-par tank guns and overweight towed antitank guns. The 57mm did appear in early 1942 but was rejected by the infantry as being “too heavy”; no effort had been spent creating a lighter version.Around mid-1942 (probably June) a new Chief of ordnance took office. Work on the 76mm Gun M1 began in July. It was not a 17 pounder; it was not a 7.5 centimeter KwK42; it was not meant to be; it was designed specifically to be a lightweight, small cannon that could be mounted directly into the M34 mount in place of the 75mm Gun M3 in hopes that a cannon with better velocity and penetration than the 75 which could be on hand by the 1942-1943 campaign in North Africa/Tunisia. The mounting concept worked; but the Sherman turret was not built for longer, heavier cannon. While the counterweight made it feasible by then it was too late for Tunisia. It hung on as the only U.S. upgrade offered for the M4 tank. Although the Armored Forces had thoroughly evaluated the cannon from February to March 1943, they had not placed requirements to fix the flaws noted by Gillem and later analysis by the time the cannon was accepted.Engineering is the slave of time. The using branches needed to be more involved with both planning and development to make use of what little time there was. The Ordnance Department were not tankers and did not shoot the cannon nor fight the tanks and only the Armored Forces could tell them what they needed. The Armored Forces failed to do so until it was too late to get the necessary fixes for the 76mm in production in time. Muzzle blast was serious; the rest were annoying and some not even an issue; but if the Armored Forces had specified fixes earlier then by 1944 the 76mm would have been a 75mm with better armor penetration. The Ordnance Department and Armored Forces had spent 21 months (June 1940 to February 1942) getting the M3 medium then M4 designed and produced: there was no way they did not understand the time needed for these projects.The 3-inch guns of the tank destroyers would have benefited from new shells and a muzzle brake sized to the fatter muzzle. The White Phosphorous shell was brand new in June 1944 (page 225); it was an artillery registration round; no one specified development in 3-inch caliber for the Tank Destroyers even though their secondary role was artillery support. The commanders of the various user branches neglected their soldiers' needs.There was never a 57 calibers long 76mm M1 gun (only the first T1 experimental gun) and it was shortened to balance in the 75mm mount (note the overhang still existent on page 107). Before and after statistics for the cannon have never been released; the 75mm M3 gained 100 feet (30 meters) per second muzzle velocity and a quarter inch (6 mm) of armor penetration over the 75mm M2 (9 calibers difference, versus 5 calibers for the 76mm L57 and L52). His commentary and the table on page 75 are wrong: The table quotes the velocity of the L43 tank gun and penetration at 0 meters (not 500) for the PaK40 when they were the same as the U.S. guns. The 3-inch and 76mm guns were the ballistic equivalent to the German 7.5-centimeter KwK/PaK40s, except that the U.S. HVAP round was decidedly superior to German APCR.If the Armored Forces had accepted the initial British Offer of 200 x 17 pounders and ammunition per month, the Ordnance Department's only involvement would have been mounting the cannon (which the British had worked out by January 1944). [As it happens the British were jumping the gun and once they entered combat they found they did not have the guns and ammunition to spare.] The U.S. had the 90mm and it worked so why bother?The T25 and/or T26 could have arrived for combat use in fit form in 1944. If the M4 with 76mm had been readily accepted to fill that role (with necessary fixes applied), then the AGF, Armored Command, Combat Command could have sat down in October 1942 and said "We do not need a redundant 76mm tank." And required a 90mm armed T20 series tank. The electric transmission could wait until after the war, so skip it. Time spent on the redundant T20 series projects and other wasted projects could have been spent hammering a better engine (several good engines appeared but the time to break them in for series use was not available) and cooling system in place. The lighter T25 could serve if that failed.The 3-inch gun could have provided power ratings close to the British 77mm but the Department made no effort to supercharge it (and even the 76mm had some untapped potential in it). These were fine general purpose guns (with fixes applied before June 1944 they would have been better). If Ordnance had acceded to the request for 1,000 M4s armed with 90mms made late in 1943 by using the M36 turret with a coaxial .30 and armored roof, with instant approval (despite lacking a muzzle brake) and expedited production maybe these would have arrived in small numbers starting August-September 1944 like the M36.Some people assume that the 90mms would replace the M4s with 75s and 76s. Maybe in 1945 to a degree, but in 1944 production, training, shipping etc. would be so slow they would just supplant them as a heavy hitting arm – which is how the M36 was used once the commanders came to their senses. The 90mm armed M4s would have replaced the M36 but in more numbers, and eliminated the senseless whining about guns, allowing combat commanders to concentrate on combat.Ordnance did not have a "fetish" for machine guns, they designed tanks according to user specifications. Before August 1940 the War Department and Infantry felt tanks were armored machine gun nests with the little 37mm to fend off hostile tanks which is why the M2A1 medium was what it was. When the extra machine guns appeared in the bow plates, Armored Forced wanted them.The table on page 121 uses the wrong designations for the 88mm KwK 36's projectile; it gives the velocities and penetration of high velocity tungsten core armor piercing shot (APCR) for the 88s (look at table 5 on page 336 for 90mm HVAP); the 8.8 centimeter KwK L56 did not use the same 6.8 kg (15 pound) propellant charge of the KwK 43; the German shot was heavier at around 10.4 kilograms (@23 pounds). The 90mm was a nudge better than the L/56. The U.S. never required a Flak41 equivalent and hence no PaK/KWK43 equivalent was readily available, although Ordnance developed the 90mm T15 and T54 as study projects. The U.S. 75mm M3 gun (37.5 calibers in the bore; 40.1 calibers overall) was not an “L/32" gun (pages 99, 106) The 75mm M3 had over 75% of the velocity and penetration of the 76mm. It was not a “low velocity” cannon.Quit using the “76mm” designation for all 3-inch guns as it was a name not a caliber; the “17 pounder (76mm)” was the “17 pounder (76.2mm; 3-inch)”.Barrel lengths and powder charges help explain where a weapon wound up but the best way of comparing cannon power is to calculate the foot tons/kilojoules of muzzle energy based on the weight and velocity of the projectiles fired. With a note that caliber retards penetration so a larger caliber cannon with substantially more energy does not necessarily have substantially more penetration. Powder types varied; comparing powder weights is often invalid because different powder types can result in different amounts of push versus pressure (chamber pressure was bad, not good).As I said: much of Zaloga's books are full of details I have not seen elsewhere and very valuable. At the same time, some people use them for technical details and all too often he fails in those details.

Steve Zaloga is known to many modellers and history buffs as a prolific writer of serious studies of Armoured warfare, US and Russian Armour, as well as superb modelling books on mainly WW2 US Armour. He has written many Osprey titles on the same subjects and is a regular contributor to Military Modelling of superb modelling articles packed with useful historical background. Following on from his latest osprey title in the Duel Series: Panther vs Sherman, this is a title and a subject Steve is eminently qualified to write upon.This book is not a typical book on an armoured vehicle and whilst it discusses technical points it is focussed on the Sherman Tank as a weapons System and how it fitted into the Allied Military machine. It is thoroughly researched and examines how the Sherman came about, how it fitted into the US Army doctrine and how it was employed.It is not a book for the modeller to find out the differences between Sherman Variants but more for the Historian who wants to understand how the Sherman evolved, why it evolved and what impact it had on the face of Armoured warfare in WW2 and beyond. It examines the strengths and weaknesses and how these were overcome throughout the Sherman's long career. The politics, personalities and doctrine that shape US armoured forces in WW2 and beyond are examined in detail.The book is 360 pages well supported with high quality Black and white images not just of Shermans but associated US vehicles and the predecessors of the Sherman. The book covers a lot and is written in an easy to follow narrative presented in Steve's usual logical sequence all well supported by an excellent bibliography and clear photos.The book is broken up into logical chapters and covers the following areas:Introduction1. War of the Machines - This has sub chapters covering early US tanks , the Military Situation regarding Armour pre and early war, the allies experience of Blitzkreig, the shaping of US doctrine etc2. Birth of the Sherman - Concentrates on early development, the layout and components of the Sherman, Dynamics of US tank Development, Personalities, baptism of Fire and the British Sherman3. Panzer Nemesis - The Tank Destroyer concept & Doctrine, Infantry support, The Italian campaign lessons; the threat of AT Rockets and Enemy armour threat including specific comparison with the Panther4. The Future Sherman: Improve or Replace? - Sherman Generations , the 76 mm gun controversy, the Sherman Replacement and its debate, Innovations and family members such as the SPG's, Jumbos and TD's and the British Approach5. Bocage Buster - Omaha, Hedgerow fighting, overcoming the hedgerows, Operation Cobra and vulnerabilities6. To Paris and beyond! - the breakout, taming the Panther, US firefly deference, Arracourt, better ammunition and US Blitzkrieg7. Through the Mud & the Blood - Siegfried battles, Sherman Funnies, Bunker busting, Better TDs, HVSS & Mobility, T26, Dynamics of Tanks vs Tank and the Statistics of tank fighting8. Armoured Superiority in the Ardennes - Defence, Counterattack, offensive and recriminations (Public & Political perception of US Armour vs German) and Ardennes lessons9. Onto the Rhine - Firepower improvement, more armour and Zebra Mission10. From Bloody Tarawa to the Sands of Iwo Jima - USMC and Army Sherman operations in the Pacific examined11. Cold War Sherman - Korea, Arab Israeli conflicts12. Appendix A - Technical and production Dataa. Sherman technical Data in tablesb. Manufacture and Distribution 42-45c. Production by Plantd. Production by typee. Armour penetration of US guns13. Appendix B - Sherman Strength and Loss statistics for US forces14. Appendix C - Allied Dataa. British/Canadian 21st Army Gp Strength NEWb. British Sherman Designationsc. Lend lease Shipments 42-45Bibliographic EssayIndexThe one great thing this book does is takes the much repeated myths and lay them firmly to rest. In the introduction the author asks the question was the Sherman a death trap or a war winner. By the end of the book you will have a thorough understanding of how the Sherman came about, the factors that influenced it, its development, use and the way the US and Allies fought their armoured battles. You will also have all the facts to come to your own conclusion however the Author has presented this for you also.Whether you are a fan of the Sherman or a detractor this is essential reading for the student of armoured warfare and the armchair generals amongst us. I feel this will be one of those essential titles in the library of the aforementioned and is a landmark tome and ranks alongside the now legendary title Hunnicutts Sherman. In fact I feel this is the perfect complement to it and should be compulsory reading for all Shermaholics.The Sherman has had to wait nearly 60 years but finally someone has put up their hand and gone in to bat for it in a convincing fashionI cannot recommend this title enough for its insight, breadth of coverage and excellent collection of photos. I could not put the book down once I started reading it. Even at twice its jacket price it is a remarkable bargain.Al Bowie

For serious students of ww2 history and excellent study of the development of the Sherman and its use by the Americans in Europe (and with some detail of its service in the Pacific) It does give space to the use of the Sherman by others forces particularly the British - the 17pdr Firefly for example - but all the combat narrative is American.As others have said he overturns the myth of 4 or 5 to 1 losses of Shermans to Panther/Tigers with solid evidence and explains the American logic of sticking with Sherman - not the best but good enough. It should be read by some supposed top drawer historians who repeat the myth of it being an abject disaster.Why only a 4 - the writing style is competent enough - but I yearned for a little more 'sparkle' or drama at times.

This is THE BOOK about the Sherman medium tank. Written by a real HISTORIAN, with quotes and facts and not rumours and hearsays. I had read many books about this subject, but this is the first time I read a professional compendium that includes everything. And when I say professional, I mean it. It includes, facts, figures, diagrams, quotes and pictures and, again, a professional summary.Also, delivery was extremely fast, actually, unexpectedly fast!

Against widele spreaded pop'criticism of few armchair-generals, I am happy with that book. Majority of pages heavily packed with WWII photos, some significant volume never published before. Eager to get other Zaloga's titles from Stockpole. If youe are track & mud enthusiast, go for it - as per 'price-to-content' value... it's bargain. Recommended :)

A well written and balanced view that shows how the development of the US armour industry progressed throughout WW2. This book is not about individual acts during battle but rather a broad view of how the M4 Sherman became the war winning weapon it was. it also counters the modern day myth of the M4 tank being a 'bad' tank.

Good read and very anti death trap . Then goes on to explain just why the Sherman was such a poor tank compared to German armour......so death and trap s then.