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M**E
An uncommon book of uncommon valor - we need more like this.
A friend of mine who served in the 173rd ABCT in Afghanistan during the events covered in this book recommended this read to me when I asked him what it was like over there. I can't thank him enough. My review:“The most difficult choice I faced in writing this book lay in deciding how honest to be about the horrors of war: the injuries, the deaths, all the things that make war so terrifying. The media in the United States – taking their cue from the American public – often shy away from such coverage, and that has not served the nation well, to say nothing of the troops or the people in those countries that the U.S. government says it’s trying to help. Certainly, there are good reasons to avoid descriptions that are too graphic, including, primarily, the desire to shield families of troops who have been wounded or killed from details that may be new and upsetting to them. Ultimately, with all this in mind, I opted to withhold some information – but not a lot.” – Jake Tapper, Author’s NoteKeep the last sentence in mind as you read this book.‘The Outpost’ tells the saga of Combat Outpost Keating, tucked in a deep and narrow valley between three steep and tall mountains and two rivers in the Nuristan Valley of Afghanistan. It’s likely a province you’ve never heard of, much less the outpost, or the soldiers who were stationed there from 2006 to 2009. Over this period four companies, 3-71 Cav, 1-91 Cav, 6-4 Cav, and 3-61 Cav, would man the outpost, and attempt to pacify the insurgents, and get the locals to come together. They would meet with mixed results, and would be under constant attack by the Taliban and other insurgents from day one.Completely against fundamental tactical military protocols (which dictates that you want to control the high ground), the outpost was placed in THE most ridiculously vulnerable place it could possibly be: at the bottom of a valley. Why? Because there was a “road” to Jalalabad there which it was believed that supplies could be brought in (the road, such as it is, could *barely*, by inches, accommodate a Humvee), and that the locals would want it for their own avenues to the greater world. Instead, the base became a target, no, a *magnet* for insurgents hanging out in the surrounding mountains, villages, and over the border in Pakistan, to come pay daily visits. And not the friendly tea-and-crumpets kind of visits, either.The book, over 600 pages long, is broken up into three ‘books’. The first covers the time of 3-71 Cav (Jan 2006 through June 2007), who built what was then referred to as PRT Kamdesh (PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team, and named after a local village), through the time that 1-91 Cav took over. During those 18 months 1st Lt Ben Keating of Able Troop would be killed in a senseless accident, one ultimately driven by the brass higher up and further away. Subsequently, as was the informal practice by Army units, the base would be unofficially named after a person who died or was killed while serving in an area (although the names would catch on higher up the ranks). While a number of soldiers were killed during the time of 3-71’s presence, PRT Kamdesh would be renamed to Combat Outpost Keating in honor of Ben Keating. Other Combat and Observation Posts would be named after other fallen heroes throughout the region. You meet a lot of the soldiers of 3-71, get to experience some of their hopes, fears, and pain, through the eyes of Tapper. There are deaths, some senseless from accidents, others tragic from combat and assassinations. And no one of the 3-71 when they first arrived and were told what they were to do thought this was a good idea/location. More than a few believed they would not go home from there. Some were right.The middle section of the book covers a two year period, May 2007 through June 2009, of 1-91 Cav and 6-4 Cav. As command of the outpost is transitioned, you meet new soldiers who are there to stave off the insurgents and foster good relations with the locals. Again, no one who was stationed there thought this base was at all a good idea/location. And there were the battles, trials and tribulations, challenges, and assassinations that the companies faced. And again, there would be some who would not go home again.The final section of the book covers from the time 6-4 left and 3-61 took over (May- Oct 2009). The environment, the interactions with the locals, everything had changed for the worse since 1-91’s high water mark. Part of it was how the new outpost commanders handled things, part of it was the lack of supply to the base, part of it was the rising hostility of the local villagers, part of it was the increased insurgent attacks, and part of it was politics back home (which is visited in the book, so you can better understand the driving machinations from higher up in the ranks). When it was clear that the outpost was to be finally closed, the Taliban, spurred on or supplied by or otherwise supported by Pakistan, led an all-out assault on the outpost, sending over 300 fighters against the meager number of US troops in the base. The final battle, which lasted *12 hours*, is fairly epic (I was amazed at the detail covered, and what these men went through; nothing I’ve seen from Hollywood comes close to what I read of this final battle), but in the end the insurgents are driven out of the base. However, at a cost: 8 US soldiers lost their lives and 22 additional were wounded. Days later the US forces finally withdrew from the base, leaving behind a treasure trove of material for the insurgents to loot (although most of it was not necessarily usable by them for combat purposes). It was subsequently bombed to destruction several days later to minimize the ‘victory’ looting.Throughout all this are stories of uncommon valor (two Medal of Honor recipients came from this outpost – Staff Sergeants Clinton Romesha and Ty Carter – along with a number of Silver and Bronze Stars), heroic actions, supreme sacrifices, coupled with stupid mistakes, errors of judgment, and momentary weakness, which all come together to illustrate that the soldiers who were there were supremely human, doing the best they could given the circumstances, dealing with situations that no one should have to deal with. These tales would be worthy of a Homer telling, except that they are painfully and poignantly real.The epilogue is a good wrap to the story of Outpost Keating. It does not point fingers to any one person who should shoulder the blame for the creation of the outpost in that location, but presents all the pieces in their places and you can draw your own conclusions, depending on your point of view and how you perceive the ‘big picture’ vs the details that make up the picture. As the author states:“I did not write this book to convey lessons to be learned. I wrote it so that you as the reader (and I as a reporter) might better understand what it is that our troops go through, why they go through it, and what their experience has been like in Afghanistan. […] But one conclusion I cannot escape is that the saga of Combat Outpost Keating illustrates, above all else, the deep-rooted inertia of military thinking.“ – Jake Tapper
M**O
Tactical Nightmare
This isn't a perfect book. There is, perhaps, overemphasis on telling the personal stories of individual soldiers and their families. In my mind, however, even this provides valuable insights, perhaps some that the author didn't intend. As Tapper tells it, a high percentage of the troopers joined the Army to escape downward spirals--alcohol, drugs, gangs etc. This is, perhaps the way it has always been in 'all volunteer' forces but it suggests that Army standards are low, indeed. One soldier is reported to have been a Marine, previously, but was kicked out of the Corps for 'fighting.' Recognizing that the Marine Corps won't consider him again he joins the Army. No problem.Nevertheless--and as a testament to Army training and the basic qualities of these troops--when their backs are against the wall, they fight. Most fight well and many fight courageously. Deprived of their commanding officer, who is stuck at another outpost removed from the fight, the soldiers fall back on secondary leadership, obey orders and fight for their lives. The enemy has most of the advantages--superior numbers, terrain, local knowledge, secret stockpiles of men and weapons, some disloyal Afghan troops--but the U.S. forces have one major ace....Air Power. If the troops on the ground can manage to stay alive, it is inevitable that coalition aircraft will tear huge chunks out of the enemy.Evidently, the Army has changed training methods since WW II. After the War, and studying troop effectiveness, it was recognized that the Germans had been doing some things very right, and we [the Americans] some things very wrong. Knock out the officers and top NCOs of a U.S. Army platoon during WW II, the remaining, leaderless men became combat ineffective. This wasn't true of the Germans. Knock out the German command structure and the remaining men would break up into smaller fighting units. If the entire platoon was virtually wiped out, individual soldiers were still dangerous. It looks like we've learned lessons from WW II. Our combat soldiers--no doubt because of training--are dangerous fighters down to the last man.Still, it probably never had to be. The 'Outpost' is located in one of the most indefensible positions imaginable. It's in the bottom of a bowl surrounded by high mountains. There are literally thousands of locations from which attacks can be launched on the unfortunate U.S. and Afghan troopers. Inevitably, working with the locals and sometimes the locals, themselves--the enemy has a far more intimate knowledge of local terrain than we do--and most of that terrain is higher ground! Madness. Some of the initial command justifications for locating 'the outpost' in such an untenable place seems to be 1. We were trying to limit enemy activities in Nuristan 2. There was a nearby large Nuristani village [win their 'hearts and minds' etc.] 3. There was a nearby mountain road offering the possibility of resupply.I'm sure many of us have traveled on narrow, windy, dangerous mountain roads. I'm reminded of one in Mexico between Durango and Mazatlan. It is called 'El Espinoso del Diablo' [The Devil's Backbone] for good reason. For most of the 60 mile distance there are sheer cliffs of thousands of feet both above and below it. It is narrow, in many places admitting only one vehicle. Meet another vehicle and somebody has to back up. It is also twisty with hairpin curves. At each curve, crosses are lined up like picket fences as mute testimony to those who have gone over the side and died. I can well imagine that the supply road for 'The Outpost' was worse than this. At least 'El Espinoso' is paved and is probably marginally wider. Also, and most importantly, enemy forces weren't trying to ambush you on 'El Espinoso'. [This might have changed now with the growing power of criminals and the drug cartels in Mexico].In any event is was STUPID to envision supplying 'The Outpost' along such a supply road. A kid with a BB gun could stop a supply column, at least for awhile. Gradually, slowly Army Brass recognized the inevitable and decided to supply The Outpost by helicopter....but...The Outpost was in a hole. It was easy to shoot helicopters from the safety of the surrounding mountains. Therefore the resupply helicopters had to become increasingly nocturnal, which has its own problems.The only salvation for The Outpost was U.S. combat aircraft and the overall poor quality of the enemy troops. Tapper goes into the life story of virtually every American soldier killed at Keating but, overall, given the incredible tactical situation and the fact that enemy attacks are numerous, relatively few coalition soldiers die. Why? The author never quite explains it. It is probable that most of the time, the enemy was firing from very long range. It is also probable that the bulk of the enemy troops are poorly trained as marksmen. A number of times Tapper mentions troops being shot at, and sometimes hit, by 'snipers'. The one time he mentions the direct observation of a 'sniper', the guy is standing up and firing. Some sniper.Lessons learned? Afghanistan is the 'Wild East' and the multiple tribes are more akin to the tribal subdivisions of the American natives 250 years ago than to a cohesive nation. Just like some of our native Indian tribes, warfare is a masculine, honorable activity. This is probably especially true in societies in which women do most of the real labor [just like many of our American Indian tribes]. The men, with time on their hands, are free to engage in blood feud and vendetta. Anybody who tries to centralize/nationalize such people is in for some real disappointments. Probably few of them want or even understand 'nationhood'. Why should they want to be in a nation that includes the tribe over the next hill that they have fought since time immemorial?Enter the 'organizers', be it the U.S., Soviets or even the Taliban. Many tribesmen will fight for or against them just to be fighting. Many tribesmen will lie to them just to be lying. Many tribesmen will take their 'gifts' because...why not? If your side seems to be winning, many tribesmen, feeling the direction of the wind, will support you. If your side seems to be losing many tribesmen, feeling the direction of the wind, will betray you. Why not? Islam? Sure Islam is important but few of these folks are radical fundamentalists. The Taliban will try to convert them to their form of Islam, in which case they will have achieved something like victory. If they try to back religious convension with a centralized fundamentalist Caliphate, they will likely fail, too.
J**N
Waste of lives,
Having been a Royal Marine Commandos wife for over 40 years I found this to represent the lack of hierarchy understanding of what they ask of their men, my husband served all over the world and he has explained the stupidity of such actions in such a death trap, we will never change the way of their lives, YES I feel sorry for the younger generations BUT we the western world have not and will never achieve what our politics preach; these countries need to deal with their own issues, billions have been spent and thousands of lives have been lost, FOR WHAT?I feel sorry for the bereaved families.
M**Y
Somewhat different to the Film!
Clearly, this book is the authoritative account of this action in Afghanistan. However, it allies itself to the recent film, both in cover and reference, and I could not reconcile the book with the absolute mish-mash that was the film. Factually incorrect doesn't even come close! The book, rightly, begins its account with the conditions that led up to the battle that won a unit a DSC and two Medals of Honor. It is detailed, often hard to cut through - but it contains the definitive story. The battle itself, horrible as it was, was just one part of a long campaign to try and help a region which patently didn't want help, or wasted it due to petty tribal rivalries and ingrained religious hatred. I recognise the description of the honourable Afghan, but my experience was always of them as lying, two-faced, corrupt and childish bullies - while simultaneously being brave and courageous in attack. I just feel that the work of history that is laid down here could have been far better adapted to the film that it is so closely linked with.
V**N
Stunning
Superb reporting on a tale of heart breaking bravery and sacrifice on the ground and some grim background of hubris arrogance and one right stupidity by senior soldiers.To chase the oil in Iraq Bush abandoned Afghanistan and left his own forces over stretched and poorly supported. This has yet to come back and bite him but God knows it bit far too many of the men who lived and fought for their country in Afghanistan.
D**R
Excellent
The book was excellent it told the true account of the ordinary soldiers who fought and died for an outpost to try and help Afghanis with a better way of life and also the incompetence of people higher up who have never seen or been to war who gave them the orders so that the troops carried out they don't listen to the men on the ground all they do is try to outdo each other till the shot hits the fan then they blame someone else
P**L
Great book
I found reading this book very interesting and feeling total respect for these guys in such a dangerous environment.The book gives a great account of conditions and what the men were against everyday it also shows some photos of the camps.I hope all these brave men find inner peace with their lives now
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